We analyze Approval Voting in Poisson games endowing voters with private values over three candidates. We first show that any stable equilibrium is discriminatory: one candidate is commonly regarded as out of contention. We fully characterize stable equilibria and divide them into two classes. In direct equilibria, best responses depend only on ordinal preferences. In indirect equilibria, preference intensities matter. Counterintuitively, any stable equilibrium violates the ordering conditions, a set of belief restrictions used to derive early results in the literature. We finally use Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate the prevalence of the different sorts of equilibria and their likelihood to elect a Condorcet winner. Full version of the paper available here: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02049865
INTRODUCTION
How does the electoral outcome depend on the voting rule? This question, quite vast, has been addressed by both economists and political scientists in order to set the basis of electoral engineering. Particularly useful to answer this question are the pivotal voting models in which voters rationally choose the ballot that maximizes their expected utility. In these models, the prediction tool is the equilibrium concept: each voter casts the ballot that maximizes his expected utility given his beliefs concerning the types and the actions of the rest of voters. Among the different findings, a key one concerns first-past-the-post voting methods, where voters vote for one candidate. Any such rule generates several Duvergerian (or discriminatory) equilibria in which all votes are concentrated in two candidates. This multiplicity of equilibria is particularly unappealing since they may be disconnected from the preferences of the electorate: as long as voters anticipate that voting is almost surely pivotal between some pair of candidates, the votes become concentrated on these two candidates which in turn validates the voters' anticipations. * Financial support from the ANR-14-CE24-0007-01 (CoCoRICoCoDEC) project and the ANR-17-EURE-001 (a French government subsidy managed by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche under the framework of the Investissements d'avenir programme) is acknowledged. Durand carried out the work presented in this paper at LINCS (www.lincs.fr). We would like to thank Laurent Bouton, Tasos Kalandrakis, Yukio Koriyama, Jérôme Lang, Klaus Nehring and Yulliy Sannikov for useful comments. Authors' email addresses: F.Durand : fradurand@gmail.com, A. Macé : antonin.mace@ens.fr M.Núñez : matias.nunez@dauphine.fr.
It has been advocated [1, 2] that Approval Voting (henceforth AV) might prevent the previously mentioned flaws of first-past-the-post voting methods. Under this rule, a voter can vote for as many candidates as he wants, and the one(s) with the most votes wins the election. The main advantage of AV is that it gives no constraints to the voters regarding the number of approved candidates and this can lead to huge gains from a collective perspective. [1] delivers a very sharp prediction: namely, in equilibrium, this rule tends to uniquely select the Condorcet winner if it exists. This prediction holds in the model of Myerson and Weber, where voters' beliefs meet the following two properties: (i) the higher the perceived score of a candidate, the infinitely more likely that a vote for him becomes pivotal and (ii) pivot events involving two candidates are infinitely more likely than pivot events in which three or more candidates are involved. We refer to these two properties as the ordering conditions. Building on it, voters' best responses are immediate since candidates' perceived scores are enough to determine the optimal ballots and show that only a Condorcet Winner can be elected (this is the Leader Rule, as stated by [1] for a precise statement).
Yet, the status of AV in Myerson's Poisson games is rather uncertain. Poisson games are used for several applications in mechanism design and, in particular, they have become the classical model to understand large elections from a game-theoretical perspective. In these games, the size of the electorate follows a Poisson distribution, and the strategic decision of each voter is based on endogenous pivot probabilities, rather than on ad-hoc belief restrictions. One can find examples in which AV fails to induce the victory of a candidate ranked first by a majority of the electorate. Beyond these specific examples, little is known on AV equilibria in general, and the comparison to first-past-the-post voting methods seems difficult to establish.
Our work is the first one to give a general description of the equilibria in this game. We first present an in-depth description of the voter's decision problem in order to identify the precise events that matter to determine best responses. Focusing on stable equilibria, our first main contribution is to show that these equilibria must be discriminatory. In such an equilibrium, a pair of candidates (say a and b) acts as a coordinating device: each voter anticipates that, conditional on being pivotal, his vote will almost surely determine whether a or b wins the election. Thus, each voter approves either a or b but no voter approves both or disapproves both. In contrast with first-past-the-post voting, the previous observation is not sufficient to determine best responses, as each voter may choose to approve c or not. This choice is driven by the relative probabilities of the other pivots (being decisive between a and c, or between b and c). In a first class of direct equilibria, the ratio of these probabilities diverge, and best responses are straightforward. We then characterize the remaining class of indirect equilibria, exhibiting finite pivot probability ratios, and for which best responses may depend on cardinal utilities. We show that, for every ordinal preference profile, there is an open set of cardinal representations of these preferences for which such an indirect equilibrium exists. Moreover, if a Condorcet winner exists, the constructed indirect equilibrium elects him. As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain an important and striking result: the ordering conditions are never satisfied in a stable equilibrium (both conditions (i) and (ii) are violated). This finding underscores the discrepancy between the Myerson-Weber model and the model of Poisson games. Finally, we exploit our characterization of stable equilibria to analyze numerically the prevalence of direct and indirect equilibria, and to assess the likelihood of electing a Condorcet winner when it exists.
